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Abstract 
Slum upgrading programs are being used by national and city governments in many countries to 
improve the welfare of households living in slum and squatter settlements. These programs 
typically include a combination of improvements in neighborhood infrastructure, land tenure, and 
building quality. In this paper, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model to compare the 
effectiveness of alternative slum upgrading instruments in a second-best setting with distortions 
in the land and credit markets. We numerically test the model using data from three Brazilian 
cities and find that the performance of in situ slum upgrading depends on the severity of land and 
credit market distortions, and how complementary policy initiatives are being implemented to 
correct for these problems. Pre-existing land supply and credit market distortions reduce the 
benefit-cost ratios across interventions, and change the rank ordering of preferred interventions. 
In the light of these findings, it appears that partial equilibrium analysis used in typical cost- 
benefit work overstates the stream of net benefits from upgrading interventions, and may in fact 
propose a misleading sequence of interventions.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
  Slum formation is occurring at unprecedented rates. A report by the United 
Nations shows that there are more than 1 billion slum dwellers worldwide, which is about 
32 percent of the global urban population (United Nations 2003). While the 
representation of slum dwellers varies across regions, there is no doubt that slum 
formation is a daunting problem. Slum dwellers account for 71.9 % of the urban 
population in sub-Saharan Africa, 58% in South-central Asia, 36.4% in East Asia and 
32% in Latin America and the Caribbean. The UN Secretary General warns “if no serious 
action is taken, the number of slum dwellers worldwide is projected to rise over the next 
30 years to about 2 billion” (United Nations 2003). 
  To address the growing problem of slum formation, many national and city 
governments, as well as international financial institutions have ongoing programs aimed 
at reducing the rate of future slum formation and improving the lives of existing slum 
dwellers. The World Bank has disbursed $14.3 billion in shelter lending over the past 30 
years, spread over 278 projects with an average size of almost $50 million in 2001 dollars 
(Buckley and Kalarickal 2005).
1 The UN Millennium Development Goals include “Cities 
without Slums” as Target 11, which specifically calls for significant improvement in the 
lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by the year 2020. While there is an urgent need 
to scale up interventions that improve the quality of life for slum dwellers, there is little 
clarity on the types of interventions that are most effective or the relative cost 
effectiveness of alternate strategies.  
                                                 
1 The World Bank’s urban shelter lending portfolio has moved from financing project based sites and 
services and slum upgrading to now include broader housing policy and housing finance loans.     3
Over several decades, strategies of national governments and development 
agencies to achieve better living conditions of slum dwellers have included sites and 
services programs, resettlement to new housing developments, and land titling. Initially, 
policies favored sites and services programs where infrastructure could be provided 
relatively cheaply on newly developed land. A major reason for the limited success of 
sites and services programs was the lack of access to housing finance for construction of 
the dwelling unit. With the persistence of large slum areas, limited success of slum 
relocation programs in terms of low retention rates and the realization that many slums 
could not be simply removed, slum upgrading projects have become more widespread. 
  Slum upgrading typically involves the provision of a package of basic services, 
which include clean water supply, sewage disposal, waste collection, housing, access 
roads, sidewalks, lighting, schools, health posts and community centers.  An important 
component of these programs is regularizing properties in situations of insecure or 
unclear tenure. The underlying logic behind these interventions is that the poor cannot 
afford to make shelter improvements on their own due to a variety of income and credit 
constraints. The focus on explicit interventions rather than on cash transfers is that 
increases in disposable incomes for the poor may not translate into their access to basic 
services. This can be for several reasons, which include limited empowerment of the poor 
(include limited community cohesion and social networking among the poor) and time 
delays in expanding service coverage (information and coordination problems, supply 
constraints in network expansion, and weak incentives for providers to improve 
performance).     4
  In order to identify strategies that are useful for improving the lives of slum 
dwellers, there has been recent interest in evaluating the effectiveness of slum upgrading 
programs. As part of this, the World Bank recently commissioned a paper to provide 
guidance on how to estimate the impact of slum upgrading interventions (Field and 
Kremer 2005). Related to this effort, there have been several initiatives where baseline 
data are being collected so that they can be used to set up rigorous evaluations of project 
outcomes. The fly in the ointment in this evaluation strategy is the assumption that 
interventions happen in first-best settings. Similarly, much of the ex-ante cost-benefit 
estimation of these interventions also assumes market clearing. Clearly, this is not the 
case in most developing countries where there are pre existing distortions in the land (for 
example, excessive zoning, development controls) and credit (higher loan rates) markets. 
These pre existing distortions not only tend to reduce the cost effectiveness of 
interventions, but also may in fact change the welfare rank ordering across interventions. 
Thus, assessing the benefits of interventions without accounting for pre existing 
distortions may in fact be misleading.  The performance of in situ slum upgrading 
depends on the severity of land and credit market distortions, and how complementary 
policy initiatives are being implemented to correct for these problems. 
 
In this paper, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model to compare the 
effectiveness of alternative instruments for improving the welfare of slum dwellers in a 
second-best setting with distortions in the land and credit markets.  With four decision-
making agents in our economy- households, developers, financial institutions and the 
government, we analyze how land or credit market distortions alter the rankings of 
different policy instruments. We also tested the effects of building caps and infrastructure   5
bottlenecks, and get similar results. However, to maintain brevity, we do not include 
these findings in this paper.  For the analysis, we lay out the residential location problem 
for poor urban households and analyze three types of interventions. These interventions 
include improvements in land, infrastructure, and building quality.
2  
To illustrate the analytical problem, we use examples from three Brazilian cities 
for which data have been collected in recent studies. The analytic strategy, however, is 
general and can be applied to a wide range of cities. We find that the presence of pre-
existing land supply and credit market distortions reduce the benefit cost ratios across 
interventions, and change the rank ordering of preferences across types of upgrading 
packages. In the light of these findings, it appears that partial equilibrium analysis used in 
a typical cost-benefit set up (which does not address pre existing distortions) may be 
overstating the stream of net benefits from interventions, and may, in fact, propose a 
misleading sequence of interventions. These findings are consistent with research in 
environmental economics (Bovenburg and Goulder 1996; Parry and Oates 1998) and 
public finance (Ballard and Fullerton 1992; Wildasin 1984), which suggest that the 
presence of pre-existing distortions changes the welfare impacts of new policy 
instruments.  
The analysis is of particular relevance for Brazil as there are more than 1.3 
million substandard housing units with 80 percent of them located in metropolitan areas 
(World Bank 2002). In February 2000, the Brazilian Government amended the 
constitution (Constitutional Amendment No. 26) and approved housing as a social right. 
The three-tier governmental support structure with the federal government at the helm of 
                                                 
2 Bertuad and Brueckner (2005) also examine the welfare implications of one particular set of land market 
distortion – the Floor Area Ratio (FAR), arguing that this regulation encourages sprawl and increases 
commuting costs for edge residents.    6
affairs, made the Ministry of Cities (MOC) as the responsible agency for establishing a 
national housing policy. The assurance of housing rights encompasses access to land 
tenure, basic public services and financial services.  
Our study is outlined as follows. Following this introduction, Section 2 describes 
the model and equilibrium conditions.  Section 3 discusses the impacts of slum upgrading 
programs. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Baseline Model  
 
In this section, we develop a general equilibrium model to examine the effectiveness of 
alternate slum upgrading policy instruments that can be used to improve household 
welfare. We first evaluate how these interventions perform in first-best settings, and then 
examine the effects of pre existing institutional and regulatory constraints on the 
effectiveness and relative rankings of these interventions (Section 3). These constraints 
include land supply constraints,
3 infrastructure bottlenecks, and credit rationing. 
We start with the assumption of a monocentric-closed city with no population 
growth. The model has four economic agents: households, developers, financial 






                                                 
3 The increase in informal housing units between 1991 and 1998 (Morais 2000 based on PNAD/IBGE in 
World Bank Report No. 22032 BR, (2002), pp 16) shows the extent of housing deficit in Brazil. The report 
indicates that among 10 metropolitan regions, seven is reported to have over 50 percent increase in housing 
deficit with Recife and Curitiba having 52.8 and 143.4 percent respectively.  This stylized fact supports our 
consideration of supply side bottleneck in housing market.    7
2.1. Households 
 
We consider an infinitely lived representative household who maximizes lifetime 
utility by consuming a composite good subject to a budget constraint. In period t, the 
household earns fixed wage income and distributes it between consumption and saving 
(St) in period t. The composite consumption good in period t is comprised of non-housing 
consumption, (Ct) and housing, (Ht).
4 We assume that each household consumes 1 unit of 
housing (Ht = 1) with specific attributes. These attributes are based on the household’s 
hedonic preferences for building structure (Bt), land area (Lt) per house with particular 
location attributes such as infrastructure amenities (At) and distance (Dt) from the city 
center.
5  
We assume that, with a given income (wt) and non-housing consumption (Ct), 
households try to improve present quality of housing attributes (qt) over last period (qt-1)
6. 
By definition, quality of housing is determined from the combination of different 
attributes present in a house. Therefore, ceteris paribus, household can improve quality 
housing by improving any of these attributes from previous period. Given the budget 
constraint, this implies that the household can decide its optimal demand for housing on 
the basis of her preferred combination of these attributes.  The government usually steps 
in to assist when poor households are unable to make improvements due to limited 
affordability. The objective of various government programs for slum upgrading is either 
                                                 
4 Ht is a bundle of housing attributes, which include the dwelling unit, infrastructure attributes, and 
neighborhood quality. 
5  See Clap (1980), Clapham et. Al (2004), Mayo (1986), Mills and Simenauer (1996), Reiff et al (2005), 
and Wolverton (2000) for details on hedonic estimation. 
6 As similar to the hedonic pricing literature (see Clapham et al (2004) for details) we incorporate the 
representative or standard dwelling quality (qt-1) for comparison. This standard can be set either by the 
households themselves under no government intervention or by the government as the social planner when 
necessary.    8
to improve housing services or infrastructure so that it, at least, maintains previous 
quality level.  We consider that the government makes a transfer payment, Tt, to the poor 
households to cover their housing quality enhancement program. Household savings (St) 
are assumed to be deposited in the bank, and the gross return from this saving is (1 
+ 1 , − t d r ) St, when deposit rate is  1 , − t d r . 
We also consider that better facilities are concentrated in the center of the city. 
Given income and non-housing consumption in period t, households’ willingness to pay 
for each of the above-mentioned attributes in period t, thus, moves in tandem with the 
distance of the house from the city center, available infrastructure and housing facilities. 
Households incorporate these individual resource costs in a linear fashion to estimate 
their willingness to pay for a house.  Households maximize their lifetime utility from the 
composite good as follows: 
) 3 (
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Where,  β  is the discount factor bounded by  1 0 ≤ ≤ β , qt-1 is the representative or the 
standard quality from the previous period, At represents infrastructure attributes, Lt is land 
area, Bt  is building structure, and distance of housing from the center of the city is Dt. 
The value of the elasticity of substitution, e, determines households resource allocation 
between consumption and housing quality and is bounded within [0, 1].  The 
parameters 1 ξ ,  2 ξ  and  3 ξ  represent the share of neighborhood attributes, land area per 
house and building structure respectively. The parameter γ  represents the shape of the   9
city and commuting technology. For a concentric city, we adopt the value of  2 0 ≤ ≤ γ  
from Henderson and Venables (2004, pp. 4-5). 
Assuming no growth and elasticity of substitution, e, being 1,




























































The above prices represent household’s willingness to pay or demand for respective 





The developer is assumed to supply building structure and developed land in the 
form of housing (Ht).  We consider that developers use the available technology to 
transform land and building materials into residential units by incurring certain cost. We 
assume the market for housing to be perfectly competitive and the developer’s marginal 
cost is exactly equal to price of each housing unit. The production function of housing is 
assumed to have constant return to scale of the following form: 
) 8 (
1 α α ψ
− = t t t t B L H  
                                                 
7 Elasticity of substitution is considered to be 1 for computational simplicity. It does not alter the basic 
results.  However, the model can be calibrated for any value of e between [0,1].  
8 Developers can be either in the public or private sector   10
where, Ht is the stock of housing in the economy, Lt is land area in sq. mt., Bt represents 
building structure. The parameter  t ψ  represents the technological parameter and is 
assumed to be 1. With price per house in period t, pht, the developer’s profit 
maximization problem can be written as 
) 10 ( . .
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where, Rt is the total demand for finance by the developer to pay for the plot as well as 
materials. Based on the developer’s maximization condition in the long run, supply of 




























Notice that the developer’s supply decision is inversely related to the loan rate, rt. 
Therefore, any distortion in the credit market that affects the loan rate is expected to 
influence the land and building supply decision of the developer.  
 
2.3. Financial Intermediary 
 
We assume banks to be financial intermediaries that maximize profit in a perfectly 
competitive environment. Banks convert their entire deposits from households into loans 
towards the developer without any friction. In return, they charge a loan rate rt. To make 
our model more general and compatible with our objective, we consider imperfections in 
the credit market. Such imperfection originates from the default vulnerability of the 
borrowers and expected recovery costs. This assumption is relevant for Brazil as well as 
most developing countries. According to a report by the World Bank (World Bank 2002),   11
the housing finance system (HFS) could cater only 27 percent of total demand for loans 
of 23.7 million dollars during 1964-96. It also reports defaults in 30 percent of cases 
during this period. 
To justify rationing in the credit market, we assume that the bank has a positive 
expected recovery cost, rc, when a borrower defaults. Larger coverage exposes the bank 
to larger expected recovery costs and eventually higher loan rates. Incorporation of 
positive expected recovery cost in loan rates makes the banks' profit maximizing loan rate 
different from the market clearing loan rate, and leads to credit rationing in the market. 
Banks also use credit rationing to hedge against default risk. Thus, banks' profit 
maximization problem can be stated as 
) 13 ( max , t c t t d t t
B
t R R r S r R r
t
ω ω − − = Π  










where,  ω  is the fraction of total demand for loan being supplied by the bank. Banks 
decide this optimum fraction from the amount that satisfies bank's zero profit condition in 
the long run. The proportion ω  lies between [0, 1]. In our unconstrained world, ω  is 1. 
A value of ω < 1 indicates rationing in the credit market. As mentioned above, ω  is 0.27 







   12
2.4. The Government  
 
The source of revenue of the city government is a three-tier system.
9 The city government 
collects a part of its revenue from infrastructure facilities, (At), provided to the 
households in the previous period. Also, at the beginning of each period the city 
government gets some exogenous funding (Gt) from the state and central government. 
With balanced budget assumption, the government budget constraint thus, takes the 
following form 
                                    ) 15 ( 1 1 t t at t G A p T + = − −  
Where, Tt is the transfer to each household in period t by the city government. The 
government makes this transfer to cover the cost of different intervention programs (e.g., 
supply of At, or in situ upgrading, etc) for housing quality enhancement. For simplicity 
we assume no extra sources of revenues for the city government. The duty of the city 
government is to allocate these funds into different development projects for the next 
period such as infrastructure and housing development. For welfare enhancement 
purposes the government can either take up any policy exclusively or its allocation 




Equilibrium in this model economy is a sequence of prices{ }
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9 We take this three tier system to represent the three tier government support structure in Brazil.   13
1.  The allocations and income solve the household's date t maximization problem 
[Equation (1) - (3)], given prices and policy variables. 
2.  The allocations solve the firm's date t profit maximization problem [Equations (9) 
and (10)], given prices and policy variables.  
3.  The stock of financial assets solves the bank's date t profit maximization problem 
[Equation (13)], under credit rationing given prices and policy variables. 
4.  The loanable funds market equilibrium condition under credit 
rationing: t b t t l t t p B p L R , , + = .                                                                                                                               
5.  The housing market equilibrium condition satisfies  ) , ( t t
dd
t B L f H = for all t. 
6.  The government budget balances when  t t t t T A p G = + − − 1 1 . 
After solving each agent's optimization problem we find from a system of equations with 
the same number of unknown variables that 
•  The discount factor β  can be estimated from Equation (7).  
•  The share of land per residence, α, is estimated from Equations (5), (6), (11) and 
(12) as 
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•   From Equations (5) and (11) we get equilibrium value of housing quality as  
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This reduced form equation indicates the direct relationship between housing quality (qt) 
and house price (ph).    14
•  Given the input prices pl, pb and housing price, ph, we get equilibrium supply of 
land per residence by inserting Equation (17) into (5) as 
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The amount of land developed and supplied by the developer decides the availability of 
land in the city. However, land availability is a function of availability of loan, ω , 
through the loan rate, r (Equation 14). 
•  Based on available land and its fixed share in production, we get equilibrium 














•  To maintain the same steady state housing quality (such that  q q q t t = = −1 ), the 
equilibrium values of land (Equation 18) and building structure (Equation 19) estimated 




















•  From Equation (10), (18) and (19) we get equilibrium loan requirement per house 
for the construction of one unit residence as 
) 21 ( B p L p R b l + =  
 
2.6. Estimating Equilibrium Parameter Values  
 
We quantify our model using data for three municipalities in Brazil - Brasilia, Curitiba 
and Recife, based on parameter values developed in recent research. From Serra et al 
(2004), we use total housing stock (Ht), total urban developed land, land price per square   15
meter (pl) – both with and without infrastructure, to estimate the cost of land and cost of 
infrastructure per house. Using land prices, both with and without infrastructure facilities, 
we estimate the price of infrastructure amenities per unit of land (in square meters) and 
then convert this into corresponding average costs per house. These estimates are 
provided in Table 1. The average construction cost per house (Btpt) and total cost per 
house (ph), have been taken from World Bank (2002).
10 That report also shows state level 
per capita expenditures on urban development in Brazil. The amount of land, 
infrastructure and building structure per house is considered as the units of respective 
assets and unit prices have been adjusted accordingly (see Table 1 for details).  
From Equation (17), housing quality is directly related to price, given the 
parameter values α, β and loan rate, rt. This corroborates our consideration of the share of 
each resource in total cost as their respective shares in quality. From this, we can assume 
that the share of land (ξ2), building (ξ3) and infrastructure (ξ1) in housing quality will be 
similar to their relative contributions to housing price. Table 2 presents the estimated 
parameter values from our model. Based on the parameter values given in Table 2, we 
estimate the equilibrium values of the following variables (presented in Table 3). 
The above steady state values indicate the requirements of each resource to 
maintain the equilibrium housing quality at the city center (D=1 mile around the center). 
In the following section we calibrate our model and discuss the demand for each 
intervention in a first best setting, and then evaluate the change in demand for these 
interventions in the presence of various market distortions. For our numerical analysis, 
we consider three different situations with sub optimal housing quality. The steady state 
                                                 
10 Table 36: Cost Break Down of Urban Upgrading, Recife, 1998 (pp. 71)   16
value of quality derived from our model may have quality equivalence of 1.25, 1.5 and 
1.75 respectively with respect to each of these substandard situations. These three 
hypothetical situations help us understand how demand for alternate inputs changes in 
order to reach the steady state equilibrium quality level. Based on these changes, we also 
estimate the social welfare to cost ratio for each government intervention and rank them 
accordingly to identify the best possible intervention in a constrained setting. The social 
welfare to cost ratio has been presented as the welfare gain per unit of money (real for 
Brazil) spent on the respective resource.   
 
3. Impacts of Slum Upgrading  
 
In this section we start our analysis with the assumption that the government uses 
slum upgrading to improve welfare of the urban poor. These welfare programs mainly 
focus on improving housing quality, which will improve quality of life for households 
living in sub-standard residential units. As mentioned earlier, we consider three such 
substandard situations. According to our consideration, the steady state has a quality 
equivalence of 1.25, 1.5 and 1.75 respectively as compared to these three substandard 
situations. The government intervenes to improve social welfare from these inferior 
situations to the steady state equilibrium. Given the fixed consumption of non-housing 
items, the government can improve welfare to the steady state standard by improving 
land availability, up grading building structure, or improving infrastructure facilities. 
These improvements can be done in situ – without relocating the households from their 
current dwelling units, or may involve relocation of households to areas where more land 
is available. In principle, relocation of households away from the city center or CBD will   17
increases their demand for alternative resources to maintain the same welfare level.  In 
what follows is a comparison of social welfare and cost between in-situ upgrading and 




3.1. In-Situ Upgrading 
 
The following analysis represents government’s option for In Situ upgrading.
12 Under this 
policy the government provides land to households, who, in turn, upgrade their own 
house with available loans from the bank.  Public interventions may also focus on 
infrastructure and building quality. We compare the changes in social welfare to cost 
ratios and demand for resources under In Situ upgrading in order to find out ordering of 
each intervention. Next, we compare In Situ upgrading to relocation strategies.   We also 
examine how the social welfare of various improvements fares in the presence of pre 
existing distortions. When the government allocates resources to households to achieve 
the equilibrium target, it produces different outcomes under market distortions. For 
example, when the land market is distorted, the government can intervene on the supply 
side and address this problem. However, if the distortion in the land market is transmitted 
from the credit market, then only addressing distortions in land market will not help 
unless the imperfections in credit market are also corrected.  
                                                 
11 The methodology for estimating social welfare and requirements of different interventions to reach the 
equilibrium welfare from our substandard situation is provided in the appendix. 
12 We consider 1 instead of 0 miles from the center to define the center of the city in order to avoid 
computational complexities.    18
Table 4 provides the respective investments required for each intervention at 
various quality equivalence, k. We calibrate these resource requirements for different 
quality equivalence targets as mentioned earlier.   
Table 5 shows the ordering of social welfare to cost ratio when the government 
opts for upgrading In Situ. Based on this, the social planner ranks each policy 
accordingly. According to this Table, the most effective policy for Brasilia should be 
building upgrading as compared to land titling or infrastructure for small or medium 
sized interventions (k =1.25, 1.5). However, when large-scale improvements are needed 
(say k=1.75), building upgrading will no longer be the best policy to improve quality. 
Rather, increasing land supply becomes most effective strategy. Given our set up 
infrastructure development is never the best option for Brasilia. 
For the other two cities, however, infrastructure appears to be the best strategy 
relative to the other two interventions for any degree of quality enhancement. A closer 
look suggests that the second and the third ranked policies interchange places for higher 
level of quality equivalence. Apparently, in a perfect world, one can survive without 
caring much about this reshuffling between second and third ranks. However, in a world 
with infrastructure bottlenecks, it turns out to be more crucial for the social planner in 
picking up the second best.  
Along with Table 5, a closer look at Figure 1 (the curve with distance = 1 mile) 
suggests that the relationship between the demand for land and infrastructure in Brasilia 
is perfectly inelastic. This indicates that even a very large change in infrastructure may 
not be able to maintain the overall quality at the same level. We find similar relationship   19
between building upgrading and infrastructure in Brasilia. Alternatively, we can support 
why infrastructure development is most preferred in Curitiba or Recife.  
 
From Figure-1, we see that the demand for infrastructure in these two cities is 
more inelastic (see C1 and R1) before the point of inflexion is reached. The household is 
ready to substitute any amount of land in exchange for one unit of infrastructure to cross 
this threshold value of infrastructure requirement. 
 
3.2. Relocation Strategies  
 
We now look at a government’s policy, which includes relocation from the center and 
compare it with the In Situ program described above. For this analysis, we assume that 
the government fixes its quality equivalence target at 1.25. One way to relocate the poor 
successfully is by providing them with more land or improved facilities that will leave 
them no worse off than in their present location. Table 6 shows the corresponding change 
in demand for each intervention between in situ upgrading and relocation at different 
distances. 
Table 7 compares the social benefit cost ratios between In Situ upgrading and 
relocation of households at various distances in Brasilia, Curitiba and Recife. As stated 
earlier, the benefit cost ratio has been presented in this table as welfare gain per real spent 
on a particular resource under different inventions. The Table shows that the social 
benefit cost ratio drops drastically due to a policy shift from In Situ upgrading to 
relocation. Further the social welfare-cost ratio of each intervention reduces with an 
increase in distance from the city center.    20
Interestingly in Brasilia, improving building structure turns out to be best solution 
over land supply or infrastructure improvements under in situ program with steady state 
quality equivalence 1.25. However, under relocation programs, land supply becomes the 
best policy for same level of quality equivalence and remains the best option with 
increase in distance. For the other two cities, the best solution is infrastructure 
development in both, in situ as well as relocation. However, similar to higher quality 
equivalence, the second and third ranked policies inter change places from in situ to 
relocation. The significance of this outcome becomes prominent under market distortion 
for infrastructure. In that case, due to unavailability of the first best solution, the second 
best policies will be different between the in situ and relocation programs.   
 
Figure 1 suggests that given the infrastructure facilities, the demand for land shifts 
vertically upward quite significantly in each city due to a shift in policy of in situ 
upgrading to one that involves relocation of households. The gap between the two curves 
in each figure indicates the effect of increasing distance between the residence and the 
center of the city on substitution between infrastructure and land.  
 
3.3. Pre Existing Distortions: Land Supply Constraints 
 
The analysis so far assumes that there are no pre existing distortions that could influence 
the performance of slum upgrading. However, in practice there are many binding 
constraints such as unresponsive land supply and credit rationing, which make it 
important to assess slum-upgrading instruments in a second best setting. In this section, 
we examine the implications of a small set of pre existing distortions. We start by 
examining the effect of constrained land supply, which effectively means that the   21
availability of developable land is fixed.
13 Therefore it is not possible for the government 
to supply additional land to slum dwellers as citywide land supply is seriously 
constrained. When land supply is constrained, market price are expected to bid up 
significantly -- depending upon the severity of the supply problem, and leads to a 
decrease in the benefit cost ratios of government interventions (see Proposition 1). 
Proposition 1: The benefit–cost ratio decreases due to land supply constraints. 
 
Proof: From the relationship between quality and the residence attributes,  
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In such situations with a binding land supply constraint, the steady state quality 
can be maintained by increasing supply of building or infrastructure. We prove that under 
such binding conditions, the household demands more building structure per unit increase 





                                                 
13 Land supply constraints could be both due to natural factors (elevation, location, etc) as well as policies 
(restrictive land use and zoning)   22
Proposition 2: The rate of change in demand for building quality with increase in 
distance is positive and the rate of change is higher under land supply constraints.   
 
Proof: From the relationship between building with land and infrastructure, given 
quality, we get 


































































We find same results for the change in demand for infrastructure under such distortion. 
 
Figure 2 represents the effects of land supply constraints on the demand for 
building structure to maintain the steady state standard. The curves show that the 
household’s demand for building quality improvement increases in an exponential 
fashion with increase in distance between the residence and the center of the city. The 
problem gets exacerbated in the presence of land market distortions. The gap between the 
two curves in each figure indicates the effect of land market distortion on demand for 
building structure due to each unit increase in distance between residence and the center 
of the city. We find that the effect is severe in Brasilia (from B-1 to B-2) and modest in 
Recife (R-1 to R-2) and in Curitiba (from C-1 to C-2). 
 
The increase in demand for infrastructure with an increase in distance between the 
residence and the center shows a difference in preferences across three cities. While the 
demand for infrastructure in Brasilia is almost perfectly elastic with respect to distance, it 
shows that households adjust their housing quality by demanding more infrastructures in 
Curitiba and Recife. However, the reactions of households in the presence of land market   23
distortion are not same in these two cities (Figure 3). The gap between the two curves in 
each figure indicates the effect of land market distortion on demand for infrastructure for 
each unit increase in distance between residence and the center of the city. 
The higher marginal utility of land in Brasilia makes it easier under no land 
supply constraint to reach the required quality even with slight improvement in land 
availability per unit of housing (see Table 8). However, under land scarcity, when 
provision of extra land is not possible, the government is left with the two other options. 
In such a situation the second best option for Brasilia should be improving building 
quality.  The situation does not arise in the case of Curitiba and Recife since 
infrastructure development remains the most effective options under land supply 
constraint. 
 
Table 9 shows the changes in demand for building or infrastructure under binding 
land constraint. To keep the household at the same welfare level, resource requirements 
increase dramatically with land supply constraints. 
 
3.4. Pre Existing Distortions:  Credit Rationing 
 
From our model, we find that land supply or housing quality improvement decisions are a 
function of the loan rate. Thus, when credit market imperfections distort the interest rate 
we can expect a transmission of such a distortion in resource markets that are dependent 
on the loan rate. In this part of the analysis, we examine how credit market imperfections 
translate into supply side bottlenecks in the land and housing markets.   24
Earlier in this paper, we mentioned that the housing finance system (HFS) 
extended loans to about 27 percent of 23.7 million requirements between 1964 and 1996 
(World Bank 2002). In the same report it has also been reported how the housing deficit 
increased from 1991 to 1998.  We are interested in putting these pieces together and use 
our analytic framework to find out whether credit market imperfections influence the 
functioning of the land market.  
In our model we assume that developers use bank loans to fund new land 
development and purchase building material. As a result, credit rationing hinders land 
development and construction by developers.   
Proposition 3: Stringent credit rationing distorts other resource markets. 
Proof: From the developers optimization problem we get that Lt and Bt are inversely 



























Also, from bank’s optimization we get the loan rate is inversely related to fraction of total 
demand for credit supplied, ω 
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Proposition 3 shows that stringent credit rationing leads to distortions in the land 
market. In other words, land or housing supply decisions are constrained due to scarcity   25
of developer finance. Table 10 shows how stringent credit rationing reduces the 
equilibrium land supply.   
Figure 4 shows the effect of credit rationing on the change in supply of land. The 
curves show that credit rationing affects land supply in the same fashion as a land market 
distortion does. This implies that the imperfection in the credit market transmits to the 
land market and creates supply side bottlenecks.  
Figure 5 shows how stringent credit rationing influence demand for resources such as 
land under a relocation program. B-1, R-1 and C-1 represent land supply when the loan 
rate is in equilibrium for Brasilia, Recife and Curitiba respectively. B-2, R-2 and C-2 
represent land supply in the same cities under a higher loan rate. We see that the demand 
for land increases as a households moves from the city center to the periphery. This 
reflects the compensating variation in terms of land provision required to make the 
household no worse off as it moves out of its present location. The gap between the two 
curves in each figure (without and without credit rationing) indicates a credit market 
distortion effectively lowers the availability of developed land and exacerbates the unmet 
demand for land. From this analysis, it becomes evident that it is difficult to address land 
market problems without evaluating constraints in linked markets. Rationing in the credit 
market transmits similar distortions in the housing supply decision of developers.  
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
There is increasing emphasis on the importance of slum upgrading instruments as 
a sustainable approach to improve the lives of slum dwellers. However, there is no 
consensus of what particular set of instruments works best, and how the effectiveness of   26
alternate instruments changes when there are pre existing distortions in the land and 
credit markets. One of the objectives of our paper is to provide a more realistic 
assessment of what upgrading projects are likely to achieve if they are not part of a larger 
set of reforms that relax various distortions that hinder the functioning of the land and 
housing markets.  
In this paper, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model which includes 
households, developers, financial institutions and the government to evaluate the 
effectiveness of alternative instruments. Our findings are based on data from three 
Brazilian cities, but the approach developed here can be generalized and is relevant for 
most developing countries where land and housing markets are subject to distortions from 
excessive zoning and development controls.   
We believe that there are three main reasons that the general equilibrium approach 
we propose here will provide better insights relative to a partial equilibrium assessment 
of slum improvement programs. First, typical partial equilibrium analysis is based on a 
households’ marginal benefit and marginal cost without taking supply side constraints 
into account. Under in situ upgrading, it is usually assumed that households can keep 
increasing their consumption of one resource so long the marginal benefit exceeds the 
marginal cost (see for example, Heikkila 2004 who proposes a conceptual framework for 
application to Brazilian cities). The argument is difficult to defend if there are supply side 
bottlenecks. Second, marginal benefits of program interventions are calculated from a 
households’ utility function, while the marginal cost is based on the government’s 
expenditure / cost function.  Fulfilling individual household demand (from their 
assessment of marginal benefits), solely based on their preferences may not yield a   27
socially optimal solution. This discrepancy requires that the problem be recast in social 
benefit- social cost framework. Third, results from a general equilibrium framework 
improve upon partial estimates as it becomes possible to assess the reaction of various 
decision makers – households, government, and financial intermediary – to every policy 
shock For example, we show how a developer’s or household’s decision is motivated by 
a decision taken in the banking sector. 
A comparison on upgrading in situ vs. involving relocation based on our model 
shows that the social benefit cost ratios across interventions drop dramatically if 
households are relocated from their original locations. The situation is made worse if 
there are pre existing land market distortions. The welfare analysis presented here 
suggests that these pre existing distortions not only tend to reduce the cost effectiveness 
of individual instruments, but also in fact change the welfare rank ordering across 
interventions. Thus, assessing the benefits of interventions without accounting for pre 
existing distortions is likely to be misleading. Further, the choice of preferred instrument 
(infrastructure, housing quality, land provision) depends on city specific characteristics 
and the severity of the underlying supply side bottlenecks.  
We also find that distortions are transmitted across markets – for instance, land 
and building supply decisions of developers are a function of interest rates and any 
distortions in the credit market that increase effective interest rates also reduce land and 
housing supply.  Thus distortions in the credit market exacerbate constraints in the land 
market. In this context, the effectiveness of project level upgrading interventions is likely 
to be enhanced if these are accompanied by institutional and regulatory reforms. 
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Table 1: Resource Availability, Corresponding Unit Resource Price and Total 
Costs/house 
 Brasilia±  Curitiba  Recife 
Total cost/ house (in Reais)  7185  7185  7185 
Availability of Building structure/House (in sq. mt)  32  32  32 
Cost of building structure/house (in Reais)  2800  2800  2800 
      
Unit Land price with infrastructure ( in Reais/ sq. mt)  164  109  102 
Unit Land price without infrastructure (in Reais/ sq. mt)  157  38  44 
Unit Price of infrastructure (in Reais/ sq. mt)  
= [land price with infra – land price without infra]  7 71  58 
      
Availability of Land area/house ( in sq. mt)*  26.74  40.23  42.99 
Cost of land/house (price of land without infra * land area/house)  4197.84  1528.72  2395 
Cost of infrastructure/ house   187.17  2856.28  1990 
      
Ratio of infrastructure cost/house cost (pa/ph)) 0.026  0.397  0.277 
Ratio of land cost/ house cost (pl/ph) 0.584  0.213  0.333 
Ratio of building cost/house cost (pb/ph)  0.389 0.389  0.389 
Credit availability ω   0.27 0.27  0.27 
 
Source:  Land price/ square mt, with and without infrastructure, has been taken from Serra et al (2004), 
Table 24.  Total cost of a residence and building structure cost (cost of bricks plus materials for a 32 sq.mt 
structure) is taken from ‘Table 36: Cost Break Down of Urban Upgrading, Recife, 1998 (pp. 71)’,  in  
Report No. 22032 BR, Brazil Progressive Low-Income Housing: Alternatives for the Poor  that reports 
the   COHAB estimates based on Habitat-Brazil projects in the Recife Metropolitan Region. 
Note 1: Availability of Land area/house = total cost of land plus infrastructure/ price of land plus infrastructure 
±  The lower infrastructure price in Brasilia, as compared to the other two cities can be attributed to 
exorbitantly high prices of unserviced land. Since infrastructure is not a problem in Brasilia, a higher price 




Table 2: Estimated Equilibrium Parameter Values 
                    Values   
Parameters 
          
                          Description  Brasilia Curitiba  Recife 
α  Share of land /house  0.6  0.35  0.46 
β  Discount factor  0.91  0.91  0.91 
rt  Real loan rate  0.099  0.099  0.099 
rdt  Real deposit rate 0.027  0.027  0.027 
ξ1  Share of Infrastructure/quality 0.03  0.4  0.28 
ξ2  Share of land/quality  0.58  0.21  0.33 
ξ3  Share of building/quality  0.39  0.39  0.39 
 
 






Table 3:  Steady state Values of the variables per unit of housing 
                             Values  Variables Description 
Brasilia Curitiba  Recife 
Q  Quality of housing  3540.94  5704.85  4771.33 
L  Average land area per house  0.935  1.497  1.256 
B  Average building structure per house  0.934  1.518  1.261 
A  Infrastructure per house  8.989  0.539  0.554 
R  Total loan requirement per house  6538.35  6538.35  6538.35 
Note: For easy comparison of different situations with respect to the equilibrium as base, we standardize the value of 
land, building and infrastructure with respect to their availability per unit of house. For example, the unit of building 
structure available per unit house is 32 square mt (based on the source mentioned at the bottom of Table 1). We 






Table 4: In Situ Programs with Different Quality Equivalence Targets and 
Resource Requirements per unit of house 
(Distance=1 mile from the center) 
 
Resource requirement per unit of house  Brasilia  Curitiba  Recife 
For a  quality equivalence, k=1.25 
Land   1.373  4.332    2.469  
Building structure  1.655  2.689    2.235  
Infrastructure 1.5E
4  0.941    1.228  
For a  quality equivalence, k=1.5 
Land   1.880   10.321  4.291  
Building structure  2.642   4.293    3.566  
Infrastructure 6.6E
6   1.484    2.355  
For a  quality equivalence, k=1.75 
Land   2.453  21.505  6.845  
Building structure  3.922  6.373    5.295  
Infrastructure   1.1E
9  2.182    4.085  
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Table 5: Social Welfare gain per Real spent on each of the following interventions 
for Different values of Quality Equivalence 
(Distance=1 mile from the center) 
Social Welfare gain per Real spent on   Brasilia Curitiba  Recife 
For a  quality equivalence, k=1.25 
Land  61.448         (2)  56.603         (2)  62.071       (2) 
Building structure  76.419         (1)  49.771         (3)  58.672       (3) 
Infrastructure  0.124           (3)   139.460       (1)  150.201     (1) 
For a  quality equivalence, k=1.5 
Land  53.848         (2)  26.936         (3)  41.358       (3) 
Building structure  57.458         (1)  35.359         (2)  42.562       (2) 
Infrastructure  0.000           (3)  100.241       (1)  90.677       (1) 
For a  quality equivalence, k=1.75 
Land  48.161        (1)  15.963         (3)  31.348       (3) 
Building structure  45.148        (2)  29.405         (2)  34.664       (2) 
Infrastructure  0.000          (3)  84.189         (1)  63.229       (1) 
Note: Figures in the parentheses indicate the respective rankings of each policy based on social welfare to cost ratio. 
Highest value indicates most preferred as an intervention. 
 
Table 6: Resource Requirements for Relocating Households at Various Distances 
from the Center 
(Quality Equivalence, k=1.25) 
 
Resource requirement per unit of house  Brasilia  Curitiba  Recife 
In situ Upgrading, D=1 mile around  center  
Land   1.373  4.332    2.469  
Building structure  1.655  2.689    2.235  
Infrastructure 1.5E
4  0.941    1.228  
For Relocation to  a  Distance, D=2.5 miles away from center 
Land    3.025      38.385    9.898 
Building structure   5.358      8.707      7.234 
Infrastructure   6.5E
10      2.958      6.308 
For Relocation to  a  Distance, D=5 miles away from center 
Land   5.499      199.941  28.290 
Building structure  13.031    21.175    17.592 
Infrastructure. 6.8E
15     7.036      21.748 
For Relocation to  a  Distance, D=7.5 miles away from center 
Land   7.799     525.007  52.292 
Building structure  21.915   35.611  29.585 
Infrastructure   5.8E
18    11.679  44.861 
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Table 7: Social Welfare gain per Real spent on each following resource for In Situ 
and Relocation Programs (k=1.25) 
Social Welfare gain per Real spent on  Brasilia Curitiba  Recife 
In situ Upgrading (D=1 mile around  center)  
Land  61.448         (2)  56.603         (2)  62.071           (2) 
Building structure  76.419         (1)  49.771         (3)  58.672           (3) 
Infrastructure  0.124           (3)   139.460       (1)  150.201         (1) 
Relocation at D=2.5 mile around  center 
Land  27.89           (1)  6.39            (3)  15.49            (3) 
Building structure  23.61           (2)  15.37          (2)  18.12            (2) 
Infrastructure  0.00             (3)  44.36          (1)  29.25            (1) 
Relocation at  D=5 mile around  center 
Land  18.41           (1)  1.47           (3)  6.50              (3) 
Building structure  11.65           (2)  7.59           (2)  8.94             (2) 
Infrastructure  0.00             (3)  22.38         (1)  10.18           (1) 
Relocation at D=7.5 mile around  center 
Land  15.15           (1)  0.65           (3)  4.10            (3) 
Building structure  8.08             (2)  5.26           (2)  6.20            (1) 
Infrastructure  0.00             (3)  15.73         (1)  5.76            (2) 
Note: Figures in the parenthesis indicate respective rankings of welfare programs. 
 
Table 8: Social Welfare gain per Real spent and ranking of interventions under 
relocation policy with land supply constraint 
(Relocation Distance=2.5 miles from the center, Quality Equivalence, k=1.25) 
 
Social Welfare gain per Real spent on  Brasilia Curitiba Recife 
Land Availability =75 % of the Equilibrium Amount 
Building structure  49.818           (1)  42.629           (2)  45.995          (2) 
Infrastructure  0.000             (2)  119.909         (1)  107.009        (1) 
Land Availability =50 % of the Equilibrium Amount 
Building structure  27.259           (1)  34.267           (2)  32.637         (2) 
Infrastructure  0.000             (2)  96.918           (1)  66.356         (1) 
Land Availability =25 % of the Equilibrium Amount 
Building structure  9.724            (1)  23.593           (2)  18.155          (2) 
Infrastructure  0.000            (2)  67.354           (1)  29.315          (1) 
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Table 9: Resource Requirements under relocation policy with Land Supply 
Constraint 
(Relocation Distance=2.5 miles from the center, Quality Equivalence, k=1.25) 
 
Resource requirement per house  Brasilia  Curitiba  Recife 
Land Availability =75 % of the Equilibrium Amount 
Building structure  8.220            10.166   9.227  
Infrastructure. 1.7E
13           3.440     8.854  
Land Availability =50 % of the Equilibrium Amount 
Building structure  15.022         12.647   13.004 
Infrastructure   4.3E
16          4.257     14.277 
Land Availability =25 % of the Equilibrium Amount 
Building structure  42.112        18.369   23.378 
Infrastructure. 2.8E
22          6.125     32.317 
Note: See note with Table-3 for details about unit of each resource 
 
 
Table 10: Degree of Credit Rationing and Equilibrium Supply of Land 
 
 
Credit Rationing   Land Supply 
 Brasilia  Curitiba  Recife 
Rationing  = 10%  1.00  1.595  1.353 
Rationing =25 %   0.996         1.586  1.346 
Rationing  =50 %  0.981           1.559  1.322 
Rationing  =75 %  0.934        1.483  1.258 
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Figure 1: Effect of Distance on infrastructure-land lot relationship 
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Note: B-1, C-1 and R-1 represent equilibrium relationship in Brasilia, Curitiba and Recife where as B-2, C-2 and R-2 
represent the situation when the households are relocated to a distance 2.5 miles from their present locations.  
 
Figure 2: Effect of land constraint on Building-distance relationship 















Note: B-1, C-1 and R-1 represent equilibrium relationship between building with distance in Brasilia, Curitiba and 
Recife where as B-2, C-2 and R-2 represent the situation when the land availability is constrained.  
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Figure 3: Change in Demand for Infrastructure with Distance under land Market 
Distortion 
 
















Note: B-1, C-1 and R-1 represent equilibrium relationship between demand for infrastructure with distance in Brasilia, 
Curitiba and Recife. Their shifts to B-2, C-2 and R-2 represent the situation when the land availability is constrained.  
 
Figure 4:  Supply of Land under Credit Rationing 















Note: B-1, R-1 and C-1 represents land supply in Brasilia, Recife and Curitiba respectively.  
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Figure 5:  Credit Rationing and Demand for Land 
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APPENDIX:  Methodology for measuring social welfare 
 
With assumption of no growth, we estimate the ratios of social welfare (based on 
Equation (22)) to their corresponding project implementation cost.  In the following part 
of our analysis, we quantify the changes in the demand for land (L), building structure 
(B) or infrastructure (A) to maintain a range of specified quality standards. With our 
assumption of perfectly competitive factor markets, we estimate the corresponding cost 
of each quality enhancement project by multiplying resource requirements by their fixed 
price.   The best policy is obtained from the rankings of social welfare to project cost 
ratio for each intervention.  
   As mentioned earlier, we measure the required social welfare enhancement in 
terms of quality equivalence. Using the lifetime utility maximization, the following 
equation measures the social welfare
14 as 
) 22 ( ) ln(
1
1





where, SW is social welfare, C  is minimum required consumption of non-housing goods, 
and q is the quality of housing services in the equilibrium.  
Let us assume that the government decides to improve welfare from our specified 
substandard levels, termed as qs, to the equilibrium level of quality.  With no leakages, 
the government has to improve existing substandard quality (qs) by k times to reach the 
equilibrium utility. Given other parameter values, it turns out that  q kq s = . The 
coefficient, k, represents the quality equivalence of the set target with respect to the 
equilibrium quality such that 
                                                 
14 The assumption of representative household leads social welfare as equivalent to individual household’s 
welfare and overcome the aggregation problem.   39




q C kq C s + = +
β β
  
Where, q represents the equilibrium value of housing quality. Now, the government can 
achieve this quality improvement by choosing a set of interventions. When quality is 
enhanced, the ordering of alternate interventions leads us to the optimal level of land (L), 
building (B) and infrastructure (A), which is required individually to reach the 
equilibrium set from the inferior situation with quality qs. Given the availability of these 
interventions, the relative rank ordering decides the government’s adoption of alternate 
programs to enhance quality. From Equation (23) we get the requirement for each 
resource to reach the equilibrium level of quality as follows:   
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Notice that the above functional relationships represent the requirements of each 
intervention to achieve the long run steady state quality when other resources are set at 
their equilibrium value. The Appendix shows how the final form of these equations are 
obtained.  
As we find from the hedonic models explained in the literature, that 





t t t t t t D B L A q q .  
Where qt is quality in period t, At, Lt, Bt and Dt are the resources with  the same meaning 
as discussed in households’ optimization problem.   40
Now, consider that in period t-1, the household is in sub optimal situation with quality   
qs (i.e., qs=qt-1).  The government targets to pull up the household from this level to the 
equilibrium quality, qt, in period t by enhancing quality k times. when the equilibrium has 
a quality equivalence of say, k, then 
qt  =k qt-1 
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Given Bt and At at  their equilibrium level. Same explanation applies to the other 
resources also.  
 